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AN EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE EQUITY AND
ADEQUACY CONCEPTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
STATE EDUCATION FINANCE DISTRIBUTION FORMULAS
R. Craig Wood and Bruce D. Baker*
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been an intense struggle concerning fiscal resources involv-
ing public and elementary and secondary education for many years. It has
been noted in the literature that there exist several fundamental reasons that
prevent any rational basis for dismissing the importance of equitable and
adequate funding for public elementary and secondary education. Undenia-
bly, public elementary and secondary education distributes economic and
social opportunities in a nation fueled by competitiveness. Further, these
opportunities depend in large measure on the quality of the public elemen-
tary and secondary education. Despite continued debate concerning the
strength of the relationship between additional dollars for schools and im-
provement in student outcomes, school quality is heavily conditioned by
fiscal resources that are purchased with local and state taxes. As it has been
noted in the social science literature, absent the ability to purchase these
inputs, public elementary and secondary education must fail because altru-
ism is not a sufficiently offsetting condition within our society. Also, people
who argue for the irrelevance of money regarding public education still pre-
fer a larger share for their own children's education. This preference is re-
flected in the undeniable fact that until money is irrefutably shown to make
no difference, its effect must be presumed from the behavior of wealthy
individuals who choose wealthy communities with high expenditure school
districts for their children. '
t Education finance as an academic discipline has emerged only since
the early 1900s. It is important to note that this academic discipline is dis-
tinctly different from economics and the study of broader areas of public
policy, but it encompasses aspects of both. The issue of financing public
elementary and secondary education is such a part of the social, fiscal, and
legal fabric of our society that it is only a small step to move the financing
of public education into that stream of political and legal activity within
every state, especially considering the wider implications of education fi-
nance, such as equality of educational opportunity as it relates to matters of
discrimination and opportunity. The study of education finance litigation is
actually the study of the litigation of state aid distribution formulae and the
* R. Craig Wood is a Professor at the University of Florida; Bruce D. Baker is an
Associate Professor at the University of Kansas.
1. See generally R. CRAIG WOOD & D. C. THOMPSON, FINANCING PUBLIC EDUCATION
(2005).
UALR LAW REVIEW
results of those formulae in terms of the expenditure and revenue patterns to
school districts.
2
At the federal level, litigation has focused on the United States Consti-
tution in the context of interpreting the limits of federal responsibility to
embrace education and on any guarantees construed in the Constitution. At
the state level, litigation has been focused on constitutional as well as statu-
tory provisions of the individual states. At both levels, these questions have
been complex and difficult. Within this legal environment is the constant
issue of whether the parties have been able to prove their arguments and
statements via sound methodological research and data in terms of accept-
able education finance statistics and research design. In these instances liti-
gants have sought to determine the meaning and extent of equal opportunity
and to test the strength and limits of constitutional and statutory language.
The challenges to education finance distribution formulae have traditionally
centered on three strategies: education as a fundamental right, the equal
protection of the laws, and the education articles of the individual state con-
stitutions.
Historically, education finance litigation has focused its efforts regard-
ing issues of equality and opportunity. Recently, more cases have addressed
the adequacy of education finance distribution formulae in terms of meeting
state constitutional and statutory guidelines. The vast majority of state court
examinations are filtered through a social/interpretive filter regardless of the
nature of the presentations. This filtering process has lead to judicial transla-
tions of phrases like "sound basic education" into "meaningful high school
education, one which prepares them to function productively as civic par-
ticipants" 3 or "thorough and efficient education" into "preparation for useful
and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship." 4 Increasingly, attempts
are being made to further operationalize these translations and empirically
estimate the costs of achieving the stated goals, assuming those goals to be
both robust and measurable.
II. FEDERAL ROOTS
5
Legal struggles concerning the financing of public education are long-
standing. Litigation has raised both federal and state questions based on
particular strategies aimed at various features of federal and state laws in-
cluding applicable state constitutional clauses.
2. See generally, R. C. WOOD & DAVID C. THOMPSON, EDUCATION FINANCE LAW"
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE AID PLANS, AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGY (Educ. Law
Ass'n 2d ed. 1996) (discussing education finance litigation).
3. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 332 (N.Y. 2003).
4. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979).
5. See generally WOOD & THOMPSON, supra note 2.
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While no federal school finance lawsuits existed before the mid-
Twentieth Century, the foundations were laid by American preoccupation
with equality and supported by a series of broader issues with education
finance overtones that would only later become apparent. The Fourteenth
Amendment's equality provisions led to three litigation strands6 that were to
have a powerful impact concerning education finance. The first strand was a
series of lawsuits under the concept of desegregation, in which enforcement
of equality before the law for all persons was sought.7 The second strand
was a series of cases known as the reapportionment decisions, establishing
the principle of "one man, one vote." The third strand emerged from law-
suits that became known as the indigent defendants and administration of
criminal justice cases, which established that defendants may not be denied
the right of appeal simply because of inability to pay for a transcript of trial
proceedings because such denial is tantamount to wealth discrimination. 9
Although seemingly unrelated to education finance, these strands were to
lay a framework for equal protection in resource distribution.
Desegregation cases were obvious for the eventual impact on public
schools. Desegregation cases were fervently contested for many years, with
great overtones for the costs and structure of public elementary and secon-
dary education. The question of whether differential wealth, under certain
circumstances, could be a barrier to equality under the law began to emerge
over time. If this were true, an entirely new meaning to equality would be
formed.
6. Phillip B. Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional
Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 583, 584 (1968).
7. The history of racial equality is too complex to fully describe herein. In an educa-
tional context, it is obvious that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was the
most critical. This analysis, however, is aided by the recognition of a long history of such
cases. See generally McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Gong
Lun v. Rice (275 U.S. 78 (1927); Carter v. Sch. Bd., 182 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1950); Davis v.
County. Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952); Butler v. Wilemon, 86 F. Supp. 397
(N.D. Tex. 1949); Pitts v. Bd. of Trs., 84 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Ark. 1949); and Freeman v.
County Sch. Bd., 82 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Va. 1948).
8. These cases are also multiple and meaningful. See generally Wesbcrry v. Sanders,
276 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678
(1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (acci-
dent of geography and arbitrary boundaries of governments may not be a basis for discrimi-
nation among otherwise equal citizens, in this instance forbidding the requirement that one
must pay property taxes in order to vote).
9. These cases are also multiple and far ranging. See generally Lubin v. Panish, 415
U.S. 706 (1974) (requiring a filing fee as prerequisite to the right to vote is wealth discrimi-
nation); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (a law against bringing indigents into a
state violated the right to interstate travel); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (state poll tax was wealth discrimination); and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(denying an indigent defendant a transcript of trial for appeal was wealth discrimination).
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These strands were actually the expression and extension of judicial
sympathy to a fairly liberal construction of the meaning of equality that had
already resulted in establishment of certain fundamental rights under the
law. In addition to the rights and liberties specifically guaranteed by the
United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court had at various
times enumerated several other rights which it found to be so fundamental
that those rights could not be abridged or denied except by the most exact-
ing due process of law. Several of these rights were established in the cases
that formed the strands; e.g., the Court had found a fundamental right to
interstate travel, 10 procreation,
1" voting, 12 and the right to criminal appeal.
13
The essence of fundamental rights, however many or few, was to assure the
equality of each citizen so that arbitrary abridgment of certain freedoms
could never be countenanced in a democratic nation.
The effect of the Fourteenth Amendment's nondiscrimination clause
was to entrust two distinct lines of litigation. The first line resulted from
unequal treatment of a suspect class. As defined by the courts, various con-
ditions might lead to establishment of suspect class wherein "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspond-
ingly more searching judicial inquiry."'14 Subsequent litigation was to create
suspect classes for race,'5 national origin,' 6 and alienage, 7 with special em-
pathy for other sensitive constitutional concerns. The first line drew its basis
from illegitimate differential treatment on the basis of immutability whereby
people were discriminated against for characteristics they could not change.
The second line of litigation resulted from abridgment of some fundamental
right. The second line drew justification from constitutional provisions or,
alternatively, whether the Supreme Court would newly construe a funda-
mental right for reasons of its own.
The concepts of suspect class and fundamental right were vitally im-
portant to equal protection litigation because, if a court were persuaded that
a fundamental right or suspect class was discriminated against, courts would
evaluate an act or a law with scrutiny. Race was clearly immutable, and
alleged violation of the rights of a member of this suspect class would trig-
ger an exacting analysis under anti-discrimination equal protection laws;
10. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
11. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
12. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
13. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
14. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
15. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
17. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971),
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similarly, abridgment of a fundamental right would trigger the same sharp
scrutiny. Under these conditions, establishing the characteristics of suspect
classes and increasing the number of suspect classes became paramount to
successful equal protection challenges. The second line of fundamentality
was equally critical in that any right declared to be fundamental would de-
mand strict scrutiny under the law. These key concepts were thus the first
strategy of equal protection analysis because if violation of a fundamental
right were shown or if a suspect class were established, then the burden of
proof would shift to the defendant, i.e., the state, to show a compelling in-
terest in the law. This test of strict scrutiny became the sought-after judicial
standard, as the only other standard of rational basis would require only
some sensible reason to allow a law to stand.
As Kurland noted, the concepts derived from these three broader
strands were quickly applied to education,18 wherein litigants launched con-
certed efforts to establish suspectness and fundamentality in education. Al-
though the origins of equality in American law are more complex than
briefly stated within this article, these strands illustrate why it was ulti-
mately sensible in an historical context to first bring lawsuits involving pub-
lic elementary and secondary education at the federal level. Regardless of
whether the topic was race discrimination or fiscal resources, the goal of
any such lawsuit would be to seek federal protection wherein inequality
would be alleged and from which it would be claimed that equal educational
opportunity was denied. Thus, from a simple hierarchical perspective, if
education were found in some way to merit the protections of the Four-
teenth Amendment, especially in areas where abridgment would be severely
proscribed, new federal law would be written that would also be controlling
on the states. The first alternative required a ruling that education was a
fundamental right. Failing this, the only alternative was to establish a pro-
tected class against whom illegitimate discrimination in education could be
shown.
Winning a federal lawsuit was thus critical. If the broader cases could
be analogized to education, the successful application meant the establish-
ment of constitutional protections in a totally new arena. If neither funda-
mentality nor suspect class were established, failure was assured because
the doctrine of limited federal powers given the Tenth Amendment's silence
regarding education would release the coveted claims of federal protection.
Failure of a federal case meant that equality of educational opportunity
would either be lost or turned to the states without the power of the United
States Constitution. Thus, from an historical perspective, the thinking of the
early education finance scholars was clear, if not flawed in the reality of the
overwhelming complexity of the question.
18. Kurland, supra note 6, at 587-88.
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A. The Federal Response
Although federal litigation regarding racial equality spanned many
decades,' 9 it was in Brown v Board of Education 20 decision where equality
of educational opportunity under the law received its greatest impetus. In an
often-quoted passage the Court proclaimed:
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expen-
ditures for education demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of
our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.
It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal in-
strument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an edu-
cation. Such an opportunity where the state has undertaken to provide it,
is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
21
Invoking the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Brown spoke strongly to the value of education, calling it one of the most
important functions of government and noting its central role to preserva-
tion of a literate and free people. The Supreme Court in Brown declared that
education was a right that must be made available on equal terms.
It could be argued that if the Court's apparent mandate in Brown were
to be fully satisfied, equal educational opportunity would have strong appli-
cation to fiscal resources because uneven revenues are at the root of most
other forms of inequality. Although it had not been a simple matter to force
condemnation of racial inequality, at least there had been a long record of
discrimination lawsuits against which concepts and theories could be em-
pirically tested. In education finance inequality there was no rich data
driven empirical history on which to rely. The question first became one of
a conceptual nature, rather than a formal legal and research standard, from
which litigants would develop and demonstrate their arguments. The only
other alternative was to make analogy to the strands cited earlier, supported
by the strong language of Brown.
The first strand of unequal treatment under the law seemed well estab-
lished in Brown because school children must be provided equal opportu-
19. Litigation regarding this issue is longstanding. See, e.g., Roberts v. City of Boston,
59 Mass. 198 (1850) (Massachusetts court addressed school segregation under 1780 state
equality statute).
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. Id. at 493.
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nity. The second strand also seemed viable because it was reasonable to
draw an equal protection analogy to geographic discrimination because it
was widely known that educational opportunity varied greatly based on
residence. The third strand also seemed applicable, as there was sufficient
case law to argue that wealth may not serve to bar equality under the law.
Of particular support to the latter theory was the belief that school district
wealth could be the basis of wealth discrimination, i.e., leading to estab-
lishment of a new suspect class. In plaintiffs' minds, wealth suspectness was
grounded in case law and it was simply a matter of transferring the Brown
logic condemning racial inequality to fiscal inequality. Plaintiffs relied on
the fact that the Supreme Court had long ago said in United States v.
Carolene that "[p]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily . . . relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 22 In
addition, there were the voting rights and criminal appeals cases cited ear-
lier in which the Court had held that classifications based on wealth were to
be strictly scrutinized.2
These conditions seemed ripe for a federal decision extending equality
of educational opportunity to include fiscal equality. The first suit to be filed
was Burruss v. Wilkerson,24 brought in Virginia in 1968. The plaintiffs in
Burruss based their claims on the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that ine-
quality in the school division's (district's) physical and instructional facili-
ties resulted in a lack of equal protection of the law because the quality var-
ied among school divisions. An examination of the arguments made by the
plaintiffs at trial does not reveal very much quantitative discussion. Largely,
the plaintiffs relied on anecdotal stories of the conditions of buildings and
curriculum in attempting to prove their contentions. Issues of test scores, or
any robust statistical evidence, appeared lacking. Of course, it should also
be noted that in 1968 such standards were largely undeveloped within the
realm of education finance analysis. However, what is critical to note is how
much this approach has not changed in numerous other cases and more than
thirty-five years. A three-judge United States District Court which heard
oral arguments rendered a decision in May 1969:
The existence of such deficiencies and differences is forcefully put by
plaintiffs' counsel .... We do not believe they are creatures of discrimi-
22. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
23. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois., 351 U.S. 12 (1956). This logic was especially
supported as the Court had stated in ruling against a poll tax, that "[l]ines drawn on the basis
of wealth or property, like those of race, are disfavored." Id. at 668.
24. Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (D.C. Va. 1970), aft'd, 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
2004]
UALR LAW REVIEW
nation by the State. Our reexamination of the Act confirms that the cities
and counties receive State funds under a uniform and consistent plan...
. We can only see to it that the outlays on one group are not invidiously
greater or less than that of another. No such arbitrariness is manifest
here.
25
The court added that "... the courts have neither the knowledge, nor means,
nor the power to tailor the public monies to fit the varying needs of these
,,26students throughout the state.
A second federal case of Mclnnis v. Shapiro27 was decided in Illinois
in the same year. Heard in United States District Court and affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court,28 Mclnnis was also a Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection suit seeking to overturn the state education funding formula
on the grounds that unequal educational expenditures based on variable
property values as tax rates of local districts were arbitrary and an unrea-
sonable denial of equal protection of the law. The plaintiffs' evidence con-
sisted largely of descriptive data concerning tax rates and related informa-
tion. The court ruled for the defendant state. The court noted several fea-
tures that were to become summative of the federal position in school fi-
nance litigation.
While the court acknowledged wide variations in expenditures per pu-
pil based on wealth, the court stated its vulnerability before the question in
three respects. First, variations in revenue were not on the face invidious
and arbitrary. Second, the legislature's decision to allow local choice and
experimentation was reasonable, particularly since the common school fund
placed, at that time, a $400 minimum base under each student. Third, the
court ruled that there was no Constitutional requirement establishing rigid
guidelines for equal dollar expenditures under the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection provisions. The plaintiffs had shown descriptive data re-
garding tax rates yet never adequately demonstrated the nexus between tax
rates and achievement or tax rates and a variety of input variables. And
fourth, the court was clear in stating that allocation of revenue was a policy
decision better suited to legislatures.
In both instances federal courts had uniformly refused to intervene on
three importantly consistent grounds. The first rationale was a plain reading
of the Fourteenth Amendment, noting no equal protection mandate for un-
equal revenues. The second rationale was equally important, as the court
deferred to the legislative branch by relying on the separation of powers
25. Id. at 574.
26. Id.
27. Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. I11. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Mclnnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
28. Id.
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doctrine in the absence of blatant invidious discrimination. The third ration-
ale applied to the court's puzzlement as it noted its lack of judicially man-
ageable standards, even if it were to rule for plaintiffs. Equality, then, to the
federal court was a negative standard in that no affirmative duty was owed
by the state to each child for resource equality; rather, the absence of some-
thing was not the same as invidious denial of that object.
The final federal issues were determined by the U.S. Supreme Court in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.29 The case had actu-
ally been filed in 1968, and a three-judge panel had rendered a decision in
1971 holding the Texas system of school finance unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 30 The case was then accepted on appeal by the
United States Supreme Court. The plaintiffs argued key points taken from
earlier successful but broader litigation. The plaintiffs contended that the
Texas funding system violated the federal equal protection clause by dis-
criminating against a class of poor and that students were denied their right
to an education. Plaintiffs were actually arguing for wealth as a suspect
class and for fundamentality at the highest level in an all-out effort to force
strict judicial scrutiny.
The Supreme Court, however, refused to accept plaintiffs' arguments
because it found no class of persons who were identifiably suspect. The
plaintiffs argued that that the injured class should be comprised of all stu-
dents living in poor school districts, rather than poor students themselves.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, noted that wealth discrimination in
prior cases had historically been confined by the Court to personal wealth,
and that the class in Rodriguez was not one for which special protection is
usually provided, i.e., it was neither politically powerless nor a discrete or
insular minority.3' The Court further noted that individual income did not
necessarily correlate with district wealth and that, even if the correlation
were strong, the Court's historic application of wealth discrimination under
strict scrutiny had been limited to absolute deprivation rather than relative
differences. 32 Under these conditions, the Court found no distinct suspect
class and held that since no student was absolutely deprived of an education,
fiscal inequalities were of only relative difference and not entitled to wealth
suspectness.
The Court in Rodriquez then turned to plaintiffs' claims for fundamen-
tality, again refusing to accept their arguments. Plaintiffs had recognized the
difficulty of this argument and had based their claims on the relationship of
education to other extant fundamental rights in an effort to establish a clear
29. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
30. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
31. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 27-28,
32. Id. at 20-22 (noting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) on transcripts; Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) on hiring counsel).
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nexus. 33 Accordingthis concept, public education was inextricably tied to
other existing fundamental rights wherein the intelligent exercise of the
right to vote and the right to free speech were said to depend on education.
The Supreme Court refused these arguments, however, stating that it saw no
more connection between public education and these rights than it could
find between housing, food, or other subsistence and the right to vote.34 The
Supreme Court especially noted a difference between hindering a child from
a public education and the state education finance distribution formula that,
in its view, instead sought to improve available offerings.35 Although the
Supreme Court noted wide disparities among Texas school districts, it re-
jected the standard of strict scrutiny, stating that a rational relationship was
all that was required to defend a state distribution formula where no invidi-
ous discrimination could be found. In Rodriquez, a rational basis could be
found in the state's goal of promoting local control of schools-a view sup-
ported by the Supreme Court's own words:
Education, perhaps even more than welfare, presents a myriad of intrac-
table economic, social, and even philosophical problems. The very com-
plexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public
school system suggests that there will be more than one constitutionally
permissible method of solving them, and that, within the limits of ra-
tionality, the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems should be enti-
tled to respect.
36
The concept, as expressed in Rodriquez, was rejected by the U.S. Su-
preme Court. Contrary to Brown, there was apparently no fundamentality,
no suspect class, and no equal protection for education except in cases of
total educational deprivation or in the established instances of invidious
discrimination such as race. It appeared from Rodriguez that little equality
of educational opportunity could be gained apart from race, as the Supreme
Court had sanctioned legislative prerogative and declared judicially unman-
ageable standards, while unwilling to go beyond the historically narrow
application of the race relations.
33. Id. It will be seen under state review later that this claim was not entirely novel, as it
had been successfully utilized in Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). It had not,
however, been tried at the federal level even though the state court in Serrano invoked the
Fourteenth Amendment in its decision. The lack of demarcation between overlapping federal
and state chronology should be noted, as state litigation had already begun following McIn-
nis and Burruss, but prior to Rodriguez.
34. Id. at 37.
35. Id. at 39.
36. Id. at 42.
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The Supreme Court ruling in Rodriguez had one primary effect con-
cerning education finance litigation. The effect was to turn litigants' atten-
tion to the state courts.
B. The Post-Rodriguez Aftermath
Although Rodriguez dictated that constitutional challenges would be
based on each state's constitution, a few federal challenges remained and
are important to note.37 Post Rodriguez the Supreme Court ruled in Plyler v.
Doe 38 that the refusal by a state to educate undocumented school-aged chil-
dren involved an area of special sensitivity that would merit constitutional
pleas of equal protection. While the Court in Plyler stopped short of declar-
ing education a fundamental right, it stated a higher level of scrutiny and
interest in cases of educational deprivation, utilizing language that seemed
less closed to fundamentality under such conditions. The majority opinion
in Plyer stated that while its ruling in Rodriguez remained intact, it was
deeply concerned that education was more than a mere service and conven-
ience to citizens:
Education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead eco-
nomically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has
a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot
ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select
groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills on which our
social order rests.
39
A second, related decision occurred in 1985, when the Court took up
the question of whether challenges to disparities created by a state's differ-
ential allocation of fiscal resources were substantively different from Rodri-
guez type challenges to disparities allowed by a state as a function of local
control. Central to the Rodriguez decision was the Court's acceptance of the
doctrine of local control as an acceptable rational basis for differential re-
sources. In Papasan v. Allain, the Court determined that while the Rodri-
guez ruling and rational basis did apply, challenges to disparities created by
37. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986). In Papasan the data was reflective of
Average Current Expenditures per Pupil in ADA, Average Current Expenditures per Pupil
for I structional Costs in ADA, and the Nwveage Crrmet Exp ditw Pen Pltit in AM&k Less
Transportation. Additionally, receipts for public schools were examined. No statistical evi-
dence was presented in the court record. See also Sch. Bd. of Livingston v. La. State Bd. of
Elementary and Secondary Educ., 830 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987).
38. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
39. Id. at 221.
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state legislatures rather than allowed due to local control, were not fore-
closed by Rodriguez.40
The final important, yet often overlooked, federal case occurred in
1988 in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools.4' In Kadrmas, plaintiffs had
argued that charging for school bus service was, in fact, denial of equal pro-
tection because the plaintiff child was wealth-disadvantaged. Although the
Court found for the defendant state, its five to four vote was sharply divided
and indicative of the constantly unsettled nature of a federal claim involving
education and further noted, in strong language, that there are variances and
exceptions that preclude absolutism in interpreting Rodriguez. The dissent-
ing opinion sharply stated:
The Court therefore does not address the question whether a state consti-
tutionally could deny a child access to a minimally adequate education.
In prior cases this court explicitly has left open the question whether
such a deprivation of access would violate a fundamental constitutional
right. That question remains open today.
42
From these challenges, several observations may be stated. First, it can
be gathered that the Supreme Court is sympathetic to the problems of judi-
cially manageable standards. Second, the Supreme Court is quick, though
not predestined, to uphold legislative prerogative. Third, the Supreme Court
is reluctant to declare education a fundamental right, and any reversal is not
likely to occur lightly. Fourth, the Supreme Court is not yet willing to create
new suspect classifications. Fifth, in the case of education, the Supreme
Court has narrowly interpreted equal protection to mean racial equality or,
alternatively, to mean absolute deprivation which has fiscal overtones.
Sixth, Rodriguez has been the controlling precedent in subsequent litigation,
and the Supreme Court itself has utilized Rodriguez to reject further assaults
on a federal educational right. But seventh, all assaults following Rodriguez
have been narrowly drawn, and it is clear the Supreme Court holds an unde-
fined interest in education that may eventually emerge. Future federal cases
will depend on changes in the Supreme Court's make-up. But it is finally
clear that no firm federal case yet exists-a reality that has in fact effec-
tively turned most traditionally pure education finance litigation to the state
courts for adjudication.
40. See generally Preston C. Green & Bruce D. Baker, Circumventing Rodriguez: Can
Plaintiffs Use the Equal Protection Clause To Challenge School Finance Disparities Caused
by Inequitable State Distribution Policies, 7 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 141 (2002).
41. 487 U.S. 450 (1988). For a more complete discussion of Kadrmas, see R. Craig
Wood, Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools: A Further Retreat From Equality of Educa-
tional Opportunity, 15 J. EDUC. FIN. 429, 429-36 n.3 (Winter 1990).
42. Id. at 466 n. 1.
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C. The State Response
The California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest4 3 ruled on behalf of
the plaintiffs in this classic model for state education finance litigation. The
plaintiffs charged that the state financial aid distribution formula for distrib-
uting financial aid to public school districts violated the federal and state
constitution's guarantees of equal protection. Inherent to these allegations
were concepts of fundamentality, wealth suspectness, and equal protection
under the state constitution. The plaintiffs alleged that, as a direct result of
the state distribution formula for schools, substantial disparities existed in
the quality and extent of educational opportunities. Plaintiffs also alleged
that, as a result of such an education finance distribution formula, they were
likewise required to pay higher tax rates in order to obtain the same or lesser
educational opportunity. Further, plaintiffs alleged that these realities
worked jointly to deny children the equal protection of the laws, to deny
them their fundamental right to education, and to make the quality of educa-
tion a function of residence wherein quality varied in response to local dis-
trict wealth. Plaintiffs sought to invalidate the state aid distribution formula
under the federal and state constitutions.
The California Supreme Court found for plaintiffs on every cause. In
establishing the facts, the state supreme court first noted that the root of
disparity was unmistakable in that aid was insufficient to offset the widely
disparate assessed valuation per pupil in Baldwin Park of $3,706, compared
to Beverly Hills' valuation of $50,885 per pupil, a ratio of 1:13. Second, the
state supreme court noted that state aid actually widened the gap between
rich and poor school districts, as state fiscal aid was distributed irrespective
of wealth wherein rich and poor districts alike were aided by the state.
Third, the court noted that such aid was effectively meaningless to poor
districts. The state supreme court rejected the state's traditional claim that
suspectness lay only with individual wealth.
The court stated that education in a modem industrial state was indis-
pensable, and noted that education had two major distinguishing attributes
that qualified it as a fundamental right. First, the court stated that education
was a major determinant of an individual's chances for economic and social
success in a competitive society. In comparing education to other funda-
mental rights, the supreme court justices stated "[w]e think that from a lar-
ger perspective, education may have far greater social significance than a
free transcript or a court-appointed lawyer."" The court then considered the
education article of the California state constitution,45 declaring fundamen-
43. 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
44. Id. at 1258.
45. "A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preserva-
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tality on five bases. First, education was essential to free enterprise democ-
racy. Second, education was universally relevant. Third, unlike other gov-
ernment services, public education continued for a lengthy period of time.
Fourth, education was unmatched in molding youth and society. And fifth,
education was so important that the state had made it compulsory.46 The
state supreme court then ruled that plaintiffs were entitled to strict scrutiny
equal protection, and that the federal and state equal protection clauses were
both impermissibly violated.
Although Rodriguez would later invalidate the federal claims in
Serrano, the case was powerful and decisive for education finance reform
across the nation. First, Serrano, dependant upon the state, proved that the
meaning of equal educational opportunity could be so broadly sweeping as
to include education finance. Second, Serrano proved that states could be
vulnerable to constitutional attack, even though the federal courts had been
unassailable. Third, under state provisions Serrano successfully established
all three claims of fundamentality, wealth suspectness, and equal protection.
Fourth, Serrano had an immediate effect, sparking dramatic reform of state
aid distribution formulas in many states. Finally, Serrano compelled the
flurry of reform both through legal standards and by the court's view on
how inequity might be redressed. Serrano proposed several alternatives,
including full state funding and statewide taxation.
The impact of Serrano was accelerated by the New Jersey superior
court decision in 1972 in Robinson v. Cahill.47 Plaintiffs had alleged that the
state education finance distribution formula violated federal and state equal
protection laws and the fundamental right to an education, in that tax reve-
nues varied greatly by school district wealth and were inadequately un-
equalized by the state of New Jersey. According to plaintiffs, there existed a
state denial of equal educational opportunity and equal protection by mak-
ing the quality of education dependent on the wealth of each local school
district. The plaintiffs argued that the state of New Jersey had abrogated its
responsibility to public elementary and secondary education because the
state statutes were not equal in effect on all citizens where equal tax effort
did not produce equal tax yield, despite the fact that state aid provided ap-
proximately twenty-eight percent of all school district revenues. The plain-
tiffs presented exhaustive descriptive statistics in terms of tax rates, revenue
and expenditure patterns, as well as disparity patterns across the state. The
tion of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable
means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement." CAL.
CONST., art. X.
46. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1258-59.
47. 287 A.2d 187 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972), modified and aff'd, 303 A.2d 273
(N.J. 1973).
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trial court agreed in principle, and the case was taken on appeal by the state
supreme court.
The 1973 New Jersey Supreme Court ruling, which came after Rodri-
guez, was notable for many important reasons. First, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court refused to rule for fundamentality. The United States Supreme
Court had said that:
every claim arising under the Equal Protection Clause has implications
for the relationship between national and state power under our federal
system ... [i]t would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater po-
tential impact on our federal system than the one now before us, in
which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public education
presently in existence in virtually every State.
48
Second, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the United States Su-
preme Court had never cited Brown as a case involving the fundamental
right concept, stating that Brown would point in the opposite direction since
it declared education to be a most important function of state and local gov-
ernments.49 Third, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to find wealth a
suspect class, noting that "[I]f this is held to constitute classification accord-
ing to 'wealth' and therefore suspect our political structure will be funda-
mentally changed., 50 Under these conditions, the court could find no basis
for fundamentality or federal equal protection. However, a fundamental and
significant turning point was that the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled the
state system unconstitutional by invoking the education article of the state
constitution that required a "thorough and efficient" system of education. A
requirement that was not met due to a lack of equalization in revenues vio-
lated the state's equal protection clause.
Robinson was equal or greater in significance than either Serrano or
Rodriguez. As the first test to follow Rodriguez, Robinson was proof that
plaintiffs could potentially prevail at the state level. Robinson found no need
to rely on tenuous Brown analogies. The genuine effect of Robinson was not
in its failure to establish coveted claims, but rather in prevailing solely on
the applicable education article of the state constitution. Robinson thereby
opened the possibility of technical examination of state aid distribution for-
mulas wherein analysis could be centered on whether the state financial aid
distribution formula worked sufficiently well so as to not deny equal protec-
tion of state laws.
48. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973).
49. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 284 (N.J. 1973).
50. Id. at 283.
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The ruling of the Robinson court revealed the third approach of an
emerging school finance litigation strategy. 51 Although the federal case had
failed, Serrano and Robinson taken together indicated that plaintiffs could
still bring claims for equal protection and fundamentality wherein an ad-
verse federal ruling on the latter would not negatively affect equal protec-
tion claims under interpretation of the education clause of the individual
state constitutions. Because the Tenth Amendment had placed educational
responsibility with the states, this strategy would apply universally because
all states had included some statement in the respective constitutions con-
cerning public elementary and secondary education. The earliest overall
strategies thus shifted to multiple prongs with sub-parts. The first prong of
any challenge to a state aid distribution formula would direct the assault
toward state courts. The second prong would seek relief under both federal
and state provisions for equal protection. The third prong would seek a rul-
ing for fundamentality in hopes of securing strict scrutiny. The fourth prong
would challenge the education finance distribution formula under analysis
of the education article, wherein chances for success could depend upon
court analysis of the state constitutional framers' intent, the inclinations of
each state court, persuasive litigation from other states, and the strength of
language of the state education article itself.
The decisions and strategy derived from Rodriguez, Serrano, and Rob-
inson have provided a legacy of intense litigation in most of the states.
Since 1971, state aid plans have been held unconstitutional at the state su-
preme court level in a number of states.52 These states have spurred the
hopes of reformers, as each instance has provided another opportunity for
determining the elements of successful state constitutional analysis. The
universality of a winning strategy had not been perfected, as state courts
reached different conclusions when confronted with the unique provisions
of each state's statutes. More specifically, defendants as well as plaintiffs,
51. See id. at 273 (1973); Abbott by Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287 (1990). Generally,
these cases have presented exhaustive statistical analysis on a wide variety of measures by
both the plaintiffs and the defendants. At the time of this writing the state supreme court has
issued thirteen education finance opinions with the most recent being Abbott VII; Abbott ex
rel. Abbott v. Burke, 751 A.2d 1032, (2000); see also Stubaus v. Whitman, 770 A.2d 1222
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
52. Opinion of the Justices, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993); see also, Siegelman v. Ala.
Ass'n of Sch. Bds., 819 So.2d 568 (Ala. 2001)); Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. v. Bishop, 877
P.2d 806 (Ariz. (1994); Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983). But see,
Lake View Sch. Dist. v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 481, 10 S.W.3d 892, (2000); Horton v. Meskill,
486 A.2d 1099 (1985); Sheff v. O'Neil, 733 A.2D 925 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999); Rose v.
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W. 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Sch. Dist. v. Montana, 769
P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999);
Edgewood v. Kirby, 777 S.W,2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71
(1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch. Dist. v.
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
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were improving the data analyses and the understanding of education fi-
nance data. The cases, at least in some instances, were moving beyond mere
descriptive data accompanied by anecdotal data as was so often found in
this arena. It has been suggested that to win the plaintiffs, or the state, must
have an overall strategy of an outstanding legal team, an outstanding team
.of education finance experts along with a thorough understanding of the
education finance research. 3
While litigation has succeeded in many states, education finance distri-
bution formulae have also been upheld in other states. State education fi-
nance distribution formulae have been challenged at various times and with
various results.
s4
Several states have ruled that portions of the state education finance
distribution formula were unconstitutional, e.g., in Idaho regarding the dis-
tribution of capital outlay financial assistance 55 and the methodology of
funding classes for English language students in Arizona. 6 Several state
supreme courts have overruled previous decisions. This has had the effect of
changing the state education finance distribution formula. These states in-
clude Arizona," North Carolina,58 South Carolina,5 9 Ohio,60 and Texas.61
53. R. Craig Wood, School Finance Litigation in America, Paper Presented at the Na-
tional Organization on Legal Problems of Education (Education Law Assoc.) (Nov. 1992).
54. Lujan v. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Coalition for Adequacy &
Fairness v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga.
1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Comm. for Educ. Rights v.
Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996); Unified Sch. Dist. v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994);
see also Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555 (Kan. Dist. Ct. 2004); Sawyer
v. Gilmore, 83 A. 673 (Me. 1912); Hombeck v. Somerset County, 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983);
Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); E. Jackson Pub. Schs. v. State, 348
N.W.2d 303 (Mich. App. 1984); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); State ex rel.
Woodahl v. Straub, 520 P.2d 776 (Mont. 1974); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d
1375 (N.H. 1993); Opinion of the Justices, 765 A2d 673 (N.H. 2000); Bismarck Pub. Sch
Dist. No. 1 v. North Dakota, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994); Fair Sch. Finance Council v.
State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1979); Coalition for
Educ. Equity v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991); Withers v. State, 891 P.2d 675 (Or. Ct. App.
1995); Withers v. State, 987 P.2d 1247 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360
(Pa. 1979); Scott v. Commissioner 443 S.E.2d 138 (Ga. App. 1993); Kukor v. Grover, 436
N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); Vincent v. Wright, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000).
55. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 976 P.2d 913 (Idaho 1998).
56. Flores v. Arizona, 48 F. Supp. 2d 939 (D. Ariz. 1999) (ordering an adequacy study).
57. Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994) (effectively
overturning the previous Arizona State Supreme Court ruling in Shofstal v. Hollins, 515 P.2d"
590 (Ariz. 1973)); see also Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 74 P.3d 258 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003).
58. Leandro v. State, 468 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. App. 1996), rev'd. 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997).
59. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999).
60. DeRolph v. State 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733
(Ohio 1997).
61. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
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From this overall litigation, significant features have emerged. First,
the supreme courts in a number of states have declared that education is a
fundamental right granted by the constitution of the state in question. Sec-
ond, based on the state constitution, there are many states in which the high-
est court has declared that education is not a fundamental right. Third, there
has been no perfect pattern whereby establishing fundarnentality has auto-
matically invalidated a state finance distribution formula by virtue of invok-
ing coveted strict scrutiny. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court found
that education was a fundamental right, but nonetheless ruled for the state in
Shofistall v. Hollins in 1973.62 Similarly, the Wisconsin court declared in
Buse v. Smith63 that education was a fundamental right but later noted in
Kukor that a rational basis was all that was required to uphold the state aid
distribution formula when absolute denial of education is not at question.
Fourth, the harshness of this reality has been somewhat softened by the
logic of Robinson, as several state supreme courts have ruled for plaintiffs
by finding equality a requirement, even absent the one feature of fundamen-
tality that would invoke strict scrutiny analysis. Only one state other than
California has declared wealth a suspect class, as the Wyoming supreme
court in Washakie County School District v. Herschler64 invalidated its edu-
cation finance distribution formula, establishing that no equality could exist
until funding was also equal.
III. RECENT ADEQUACY LAWSUITS
In recent years an additional movement has emerged in challenging the
state finance distribution formulae. The plaintiffs argue that the state aid
distribution formula is fiscally and thus educationally inadequate. Thus, it is
argued, the state aid distributional formula fails the state constitutional
mandate and the applicable statutory mandates for an education that meets
minimal standards. A few of these suits have emerged after the applicable
state supreme court has ruled that equity was either already met, or only the
legislature could define such a concept. In a few instances, these suits essen-
tially question the concept of "the equality of poverty." if a state aid distri-
bution formula allocates funds in an equitable manner, but such funds were,
by definition, unable to meet various educational and academic standards
such a distribution formula would be by definition inadequate. The question
then becomes whether the distribution formula then violates the applicable
constitutional and statutory obligations of the state. The specific question is
62. 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973).
63. 247 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1976).
64. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo. 1980).
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how the plaintiffs are able to satisfactorily demonstrate this concept that
reflects reality of such a large social science undertaking.
Various legislatures have unwittingly established a standard by which
many plaintiff groups are able to question and attempt to quantitatively es-
tablish noncompliance via the state distribution formula. In the movement
toward greater educational accountability and raising academic standards
for the public schools of a given state, the legislature has, unsuspectingly,
defined by statute what an adequate education consists of. Thus, when
school districts are not able to meet those stated standards, due to fiscal con-
straints as placed upon them by various constitutional tax limitations, statu-
tory and economic realities, the plaintiffs argue for relief. The relief sought
is to declare the state aid distributional formula unconstitutional.
In recent years, state legislatures have faced an increasing number of
challenges to the state financial distribution formula based on the concept of
adequacy. Generally, the plaintiffs are not challenging the equity of the dis-
tribution formula in the conventional sense. Most recent arguments have
centered not on whether wealthy and poor districts have roughly the same
amount of revenue per pupil, but whether in general, there is enough fund-
ing to achieve state standards, and further, whether districts with higher
concentrations of high need students have sufficient additional funding,
beyond the basic level of funding, to achieve the same standards. In many
cases, plaintiffs link insufficient overall funding, or insufficient additional
support primarily in poor urban schools, to insufficient student outcomes
occurring disproportionately in those same schools. The plaintiffs argue
that, by virtue of the fact that certain groups of children are underachieving
on these state-imposed sanctions, the distribution formula is, by definition,
inadequate, at least for these groups of children.
A. Educational Adequacy
Also, increasingly, several states have attempted to determine the ade-
quacy of public education. An overview of these adequacy studies reveals
an increase of approximately thirty to fifty percent of expenditures that
would be necessary to meet an adequate level for public education. Several
studies have been conducted to date.65 At the time of this writing, several
states are exploring the measurement of adequacy. This list includes Cali-
fornia, which has established the California Quality Education Commission
and is charged with the responsibility of determining the educational com-
65. See, e.g., JOHN AUGENBLICK, ROBERT PALAICH & JUSTIN SILVERSTEIN, AN
ESTIMATION OF THE TOTAL COST OF IMPLEMENTING THE RESULTS OF THE SCHOOL FINANCE
ADEQUACY STUDY (2003); JoHN AUGENBLICK & J. MEYERS, "SCHOOL FINANCE EQUITY &
ADEQUACY IN SOUTH CAROLINA, available at http://www.thescea.org/pdf/schoolfunding.pdf
(last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
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ponents, fiscal resources, and corresponding costs necessary so that students
can meet academic performance standards.66 Oregon established the Quality
Education Commission that published the Quality Education Model that
utilized three broad-based panels to determine the costs of an adequate edu-
67cation in the state of Oregon.
B. The Measurement of Educational Adequacy
68
Determining the adequacy of public elementary and secondary educa-
tion is, at best, a difficult task. In attempting to determine adequacy there
are several models currently in practice. Important considerations for under-
taking studies of educational adequacy include (a) conceptual, (b) contex-
tual and (c) technical considerations.
1. Conceptual
Is a state legislature guided by input standards of adequacy or outcome
standards? Does a legislature perceive an adequate education to consist of a
prescribed set of educational inputs, such as numbers of teachers per pupil,
materials and supplies and facilities? Or, does the legislature perceive an
adequate education to be reflected in certain student outcome measures?
Certain methods for measuring the cost of educational adequacy focus on
schooling inputs, while others focus on schooling outcomes. Where a state
legislature's emphasis is on achieving adequate outcomes, it is argued that
the state should make use of outcome based, or performance oriented analy-
ses.
2. Contextual
The political, economic, and demographic context of each state is dif-
ferent. Some states are more economically and demographically complex
than others. Some states are more political diverse than others. Different
methods may work better in different contexts. Key contextual questions
include the following: Is there political consensus around desired inputs or
outcomes? Is the state relatively homogenous or heterogeneous in geogra-
phy, demographics, and economics?
66. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 64200-64203 (West 2004).
67. QUALITY EDUCATION COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY QUALITY EDUCATION COMMISSION
REPORT (2002), available at
http://www.ode.state.dr.us/stda/qualityed/docs/qec2ExecSum4alelectronic.pdf.
68. This portion of this poper is adapted from R. CRAIG WOOD AND BRUCE BAKER,
FINANCING MISSOURI'S PUBLIC ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY SCHOOLS: FINAL REPORT (2004).
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3. Technical
Related to the demographic and economic complexity of a state are a
variety of technical concerns. Different methods have different technical
strengths and weaknesses. Key questions include: If the state were suffi-
ciently heterogeneous, is the method in question sufficiently rigorous for
estimating cost variations across school districts of different characteristics
serving varied student populations? Are there sufficient data for estimating
costs and cost variations?
C. Types of Adequacy Studies
Three major categories of adequacy studies presently dominate the
landscape. Those categories include average expenditure studies, resource
cost studies, and statistical modeling studies.
1. Average Expenditure Studies
Prior to the 1990s, concepts regarding educational adequacy were often
guided by the average or median expenditures of school districts in the prior
year. A common presumption was that median spending was adequate, and
that states should strive to bring the lower half of districts up to the median.
With increased prevalence of state standards and assessments, consult-
ants and policymakers in the early 1990s turned their attention to the aver-
age expenditures of school districts meeting a prescribed set of outcome
standards, rather than the simple average or median of all school districts.
This approach was coined the Successful Schools Model.
Successful schools studies utilize outcome data on measures such as at-
tendance and dropout rates and student test scores to identify that set of
schools or school districts in a state that meet a chosen standard of success.
Then, the average of the expenditures of those schools or school districts
was considered adequate (on the assumption that some schools in the state
are able to be successful with that level of funding). Modified successful
schools analyses include some consideration of how schools utilized the
resources. This is done in either of two ways. In most cases, analysts may
utilize data on how schools use the resources to identify and exclude pecu-
liar, or outlier schools or districts from the successful schools sample. Al-
ternatively, one might seek patterns in resource allocation to identify those
schools that allocate resources in such a way as to produce particularly high
outcomes, with particularly low expenditures. Early successful schools
analyses in Ohio used data on district resource allocation as a partial basis
for modifying the sample of districts to be used for calculating average costs
of achieving standards. Proposed analyses in New York recommend deeper
analyses of how successful districts organize resources.
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2. Resource Cost Studies
The Resource Cost Model (RCM) is a method that has been used ex-
tensively for measuring the costs of educational services. 69 In general, RCM
is a method for measuring costs of services, existing or hypothetical, ade-
quate or not. The RCM methodology typically involves three steps: (1)
identifying and/or measuring the resources (people, space, and time) used in
providing a particular set of services; (2) estimating resource prices, and
price variations from school to school or school district to school district;
and (3) tabulating total costs of service delivery by totaling the resource
quantities (resource intensity) and the prices. Resource cost methods have
been used for calculating the cost of providing adequate educational ser-
vices since the early 1980s.
Two relatively new variants of RCM have been specifically tailored to
measure the costs of an "adequate" education-professional-judgment-
driven RCM and evidence-based RCM. The difference between them lies in
the strategy for identifying the resources required to provide an adequate
education. In professional judgment studies, focus groups of educators and
policymakers are typically convened to prescribe the "basket of educational
goods and services" required for providing an adequate education. In evi-
dence-based studies, resource needs for staffing and staff development are
derived from "proven effective" Comprehensive School Reform (CSR)
models like Robert Slavin's Roots and Wings/Success for All, which focus
on improving educational outcomes in high poverty schools. 70 More recent
evidence-based analyses have striven to integrate a variety of "proven effec-
tive" input strategies such as class size reduction, specific interventions for
special student populations and comprehensive school reform models, rather
than relying on a single reform model.
Because evidence based strategies have been recently broadened to in-
clude and blend a variety of reform strategies, this article utilizes the phrase
evidence based rather than cost of comprehensive school reforms to de-
scribe the approach. It is noted, however, that this may lead to a blurred
distinction between evidence based and professional judgment models. One
might assume, for example, that a panel of well informed professionals
69. See United States Dep't of Educ. NATIONAL CENTER FOR FDUCATION STATISTICS,
MEASURING RESOURCES IN EDUCATION: FROM ACCOUNTING TO THE RESOURCE COST MODEL
APPROACH: WORKING PAPER NO. 1999-16 (1999), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs99/199916.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2004); W. Hartman, D. Bolton &
D. Monk, A Synthesis of Two Approaches to School-Level Financial Data: The Accounting
and Resource Cost Model Approaches, in SELECTED PAPERS IN SCHOOL FINANCE, 2000-01
(W. Fowler ed., 2001).
70. Allan Odden, Costs of Sustaining Educational Change Via Comprehensive School
Reform, 81 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 433, 433-38 (2000).
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would prescribe inputs for schools based at least partly on the professionals'
knowledge of research literature on effective reform strategies. The subtle
distinction between this and evidence based analysis is that evidence based
analysis requires an empirical research basis for recommended resource
configurations. Further, in evidence-based analysis the recommendation is
provided by consultants conducting the cost study, and does not typically
include panels of experts from schools and districts in the state.
3. Statistical Modeling Studies
Less common among recent analyses of educational adequacy are sta-
tistical methods that may be used either to estimate (a) the quantities and
qualities of educational resources associated with higher or improved educa-
tional outcomes or (b) the costs associated with achieving a specific set of
outcomes, in different school districts, serving different student populations.
The first of these methods is known as the education production function
and the second of these methods is known as the education cost function.
The two are highly interconnected and-like successful schools analysis-
require policymakers to establish explicit, measurable outcome goals.
Education production function analysis can be used to determine which
quantities and qualities of educational resources are most strongly, posi-
tively associated with a designated set of student outcomes. For example, is
it better for a school to have more teachers or fewer teachers with stronger
academic preparation at the same total cost to maximize some desired out-
come? Further, education production function analysis can be utilized to
determine whether different resource quantities and qualities are more or
less effective in districts serving different types of students (economically
disadvantaged, English language learners), or in different types of districts
(large urban, small remote rural).
Cost function analyses, like production function analyses, utilizes cer-
tain statistical equations. In cost function analysis, the goal is to estimate the
cost of achieving a desired set of educational outcomes and further to esti-
mate how those costs differs in districts with certain characteristics, serving
students with certain characteristics. For example, achieving state average
outcomes in a high poverty urban district may have quite different costs
than achieving the same outcomes in an affluent suburb. A cost function
that has been estimated with existing data on school district spending levels
and outcomes, and including data on district and student characteristics, can
be used for predicting the average cost of achieving a desired level of out-
comes in a district of average characteristics serving a student population of
average characteristics. Further, the cost function can be utilized to generate
a cost index for each school district that indicates the relative cost of pro-
ducing the desired outcomes in each school district. For example, it would
likely be found that per pupil costs of achieving target outcomes are higher
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than average in small, rural school districts, that costs are higher in school
districts with high percentages of economically disadvantaged and limited
English proficient children, and that costs are higher where competitive
wages for teachers are higher.
The cost function is an extension of the production function where the
goal is to estimate directly, in a single model, the costs of achieving desired
outcomes, while with a production function, the goal is to identify those
inputs that produce desirable outcomes, and subsequently estimate the cost
of those inputs. To date, outcome measures used in cost function studies
have been narrowly specified, including primarily measures of student
achievement in core subject areas.
D. Reconciling the Various Approaches
In a perfect world, with perfect information regarding the relationship
between resource mix and student outcomes (for guiding bottom-up analy-
sis), perfect data on student outcomes, and perfect measures of district inef-
ficiency (for guiding top-down analysis), resource cost and statistical cost
function analysis would produce the same results. All distortions to or dif-
ferences in cost estimates would be eliminated in each type of analysis. Re-
sulting distortions of resource oriented versus performance-oriented analy-
ses may be quite similar or quite different.
Ideally, investigators using resource cost approaches for calculating the
cost of adequacy would have perfect information regarding the lowest cost
mix of resources that would lead to the desired educational outcomes for a
given set of students under a given set of conditions. As noted, resource mix
is most often arrived at not by estimating the relationship between resource
mix and existing student outcomes, but either by the recommendations of
expert panels (professional judgment), or by identifying specific educational
reform models believed by researchers to be effective. To date, evidence on
the effectives, and more specifically the cost effectives, of comprehensive
school reforms that commonly guide such analyses remains questionable at
best.
71
71. Henry M. Levin, The Cost Effectiveness of Whole School Reforms No. 114 of Urban
Diversity Series, (ERIC Clearinghouse on Urban Education 2002); Geoffry D. Borman &
Gina M. Hewes, The Long-Term Effects and Cost Effectiveness of Success for All, 24 EDUC.
EVALUATION & POL'y ANALYSIS 243, 243-66 (2003), available at
http://www.successforall.com/Resource/PDFs/L; Geoffrey D. Bormari et al., Comprehensive
School Reform and Achievement: A Meta-Analysis, 73 REV. OF EfPUC. RES. 125 (2002);.
Robert Bilfulco et al., Do WHOLE SCHOOL REFORM PROGRAMS BOOST STUDENT PERFORM-
ANcE?: THE CASE OF NEW YORKC CITY (Center for Policy Research, Working Paper No. 55,
2003).
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Where the prescribed resource mix is not the most efficient mix that
could be purchased at a given total cost, resource cost analyses will lead to
distortions in cost indices and these distortions may or may not apply uni-
formly across school districts of varied scale or of varied student popula-
tions. For example, resource intensity required to achieve specific outcomes
in a certain type of school district may be overstated by expert panels or
prescribed models. It is safe to assume that most cost indices, produced by
resource cost analyses include at least some such distortion.
Similar problems exist in the estimation of statistical models of costs.
Statistical models of costs rely on existing school district expenditure data,
and estimated relationships between expenditure data and current levels of
student outcomes. Attempts are made to subtract inefficiencies from expen-
diture data. It is possible that a school district with a specific set of charac-
teristics currently spends more than necessary to achieve its current level of
outcomes. Further, it is possible that common patterns of inefficiency exist
across all, or similar sets of school districts in a given state. Where some or
all of these inefficiencies go unmeasured, actual costs (assuming either av-
erage, or maximum efficiency) of outcomes may be overstated for some or
all districts.
1. Findings of Cost Studies
The growing track record regarding adequacy analysis, replication of
analyses in the same states under different sponsorship, and application of
alternative methods under the same sponsorship in some states provides
increased opportunities to compare the results of adequacy studies and as-
sess whether certain patterns exist. In this section, the findings of selected
studies of the cost of an adequate education are discussed, focusing first on
basic costs, then on additional costs associated with district characteristics
and student population characteristics.
a. Basic costs
Table 1 summarizes the findings of average expenditure studies over
the last decade. Note that in general, average expenditure estimates vary
within a state as a function of choosing different desired outcome standards.
When consultants select that set of school districts that achieve very high
outcome standards, expenditures are often higher than when consultants
select a set of school districts meeting more modest outcome standards.
Note that this finding may occur for a variety of reasons. First, the logical
assumption that it costs more to achieve higher outcomes may hold. How-
ever, because average expenditure studies fail to control for a variety of
other school district factors, the higher spending rates of highly successful
schools are often a function of high wealth communities that choose to
2004]
UALR LAW REVIEW
spend more on schools and at the same time, due to socioeconomic condi-
tions, have high performing children. A recent study in Illinois made some
attempt to accommodate this shortcoming by grouping schools by poverty
rates. In Illinois, among low poverty schools, schools achieving the eighty
percent standard spent, on average, $4,470 per pupil while schools achiev-
ing the 100% standard spent $5,270.
TABLE 1. RESULTS OF AVERAGE EXPENDITURE STUDIES
Inflation State
Basic Adjusted Average Regionally
Data/ Cost Cost Regional Adjusted
Study Cost (Current (2000 Cost Cost (2000
State Release Year Dollars) Dollars) Index Dollars)
Mississippi 1993 1992 $ 2,614 $ 3,203 0.87 $ 3,675
Illinois (a) 2001 2000 $ 4,470 $ 4,470 1.04 $ 4,309
Ohio 1997 1996 $ 3,930 $ 4,304 0.99 $ 4,347
Colorado 2003 2001 $ 4,654 $ 4,514 0.99 $ 4,564
Ohio (low) 1999 1999 $ 4,446 $ 4,574 0.99 $ 4,619
Kansas 2001 2000 $ 4,547 $ 4,547 0.90 $ 5,059
Illinois (b) 2001 2000 $ 5,270 $ 5,270 1.04 $ 5,080
Missouri 2003 2002 $ 5,664 $ 5,389 0.95 $ 5,655
Ohio (high) 1999 1999 $ 5,560 $ 5,720 0.99 $ 5,777
Maryland 2001 2000 $ 5,969 $ 5,969 1.02 $ 5,853
Illinois (a) Low cost of 90% standard with low poverty
Illinois (b) Low cost of 100% standard with low poverty
Table 2 summarizes findings of resource cost studies, most of which
have employed professional judgment panels to discern the appropriate mix
of resources for schools. Table 2 includes estimates of resource costs for
Kentucky, where an evidence-based approach was used. Regional and infla-
tion adjusted estimates vary widely. Again, one might suspect that some of
this variation is due to differences in desired outcomes from state to state. If
professional judgment panels in Oregon were specifying a resource mix
toward achieving a lower outcome standard than professional judgment
panels in Missouri, then it would be reasonable that the cost of achieving
those standards would be lower. Yet, the link between inputs and outcomes
in resource based analyses remains relatively loose, and no attempts have
yet been made with resource cost analysis, to estimate the costs of achieving
alternative outcomes in the same state context, in the same year.
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TABLE 2. RESULTS OF RESOURCE COST STUDIES
Inflation State
Basic Adjusted Average Regionally
Data/ Cost Cost Regional Adjusted
Study Cost (Current (2000 Cost Cost (2000
State Method Release Year Dollars) Dollars) Index Dollars)
Oregon PJ 2000 2002 $ 5,762 $ 5,482 0.97 $ 5,668
Nebraska PJ 2003 2002 $ 5,845 $ 5,561 0.89 $ 6,248
Montana PJ 2003 2002 $ 6,048 $ 5,755 0.91 $ 6,336
Kentucky EV 2003 2003 $ 6,130 $ 5,740 0.90 $ 6,408
North
Dakota PJ 2003 2002 $ 6,005 $ 5,714 0.89 $ 6,420
Kansas PJ 2001 2000 $ 5,811 $ 5,811 0.90 $6,466
Maryland PJ 2001 2000 $ 6,612 $ 6,612 1.02 $ 6,484
Colorado PJ 2003 2001 $ 6,815 $ 6,610 0.99 $ 6,683
Indiana PJ 2002 2002 $ 7,094 $ 6,750 0.94 $ 7,215
Washington PJ 2003 2002 $ 7,992 $ 7,604 1.04 $7,316
Missouri PJ 2003 2002 $ 7,832 $ 7,452 0.95 $ 7,819
Wisconsin PJ 2002 2002 $ 8,730 $ 8,306 0.96 $ 8,674
Table 3 summarizes the findings from selected recent statistical
models of education costs. These statistical models in particular present
major advancements over average expenditure studies in that they not
only include a direct link between expenditures and outcomes, but by
using rich data on school district characteristics and student population
demographics, the models cati be used to simulate the costs of achieving
state average outcomes in a district of average characteristics. Further,
one can estimate how the costs of achieving average outcomes varies in
school districts with high need student populations and how costs vary
when one changes the outcome target to higher or lower than average
outcomes. As with successful schools analysis, findings from New York
state indicate that striving for higher outcome standards necessarily costs
more, even in generally lower cost districts.
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TABLE 3. RESULTS OF SELECTED COST FUNCTION STUDIES
Inflation State
Basic Adjusted Average Regionally
Data/ Cost Cost Regional Adjusted
Study Cost (CIrrent (20001 Cost Cost (2wo
State Release Year Dollars) Dollars) Index Dollars)
Texas
(Mean) 2001 1997 $ 5,610 1 $ 5,974 0.95 $ 6,321
New York
(Low) 2002 2000 $ 8,423 2 $ 8,423 1.13 $ 7,471
Wisconsin
(Mean) 1998 1995 $ 6,372 1 $ 7,168 0.96 $ 7,485
New York
(Middle) 2002 2000 $ 8,652 2 $ 8,652 1.13 $ 7,675
New York
(High) 2002 2000 $ 9,032 2 $ 9,032 1.13 $ 8,012
1. Cost of achieving average outcomes in district of average character-
istics
2. Cost of achieving the designated performance standard for upstate
suburbs presently below the specified standard. Average performance of
upstate suburbs below the 140 standard was 130, below the 150 standard
was 146 and below the 160 standard, was 149.
b. Additional costs of district needs and student needs
Table 4 summarizes the additional costs associated with small school
district size from six separate resource cost studies. In each case the school
district of minimum costs is represented with a cost index of 1.0. The mini-
mum cost district is typically a larger, scale efficient district. Note that in
Kansas a school district with 200 students was estimated as having costs
forty-eight percent above those of a school district with 11,200 students. In
North Dakota, in contrast, a school district with 208 students was estimated
to have costs only nine percent above a large school district and in Nebraska
a school district with 182 students was estimated to have costs ninety-three
percent above the minimum. That said, when aggregated, all of the findings
in Table 4 together suggest that costs generally level off in school districts
with approximately 5,000 students, and increase most sharply in school
districts with fewer than 300 students. This finding is consistent with recent
comprehensive reviews of economic literature.72
72. Matthew Andrews et al., Revisiting Economies of Size in American Education: Are
We Any Closer to a Consensus?, 21 ECONS. OF EDUC. REv. 245 (2002).
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TABLE 4. ESTIMATED COST ADJUSTMENTS FOR ECONOMIES OF SCALE
(RESOURCE COST)73
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Table 5 summarizes, by school district size, the estimated adjustments
for the additional costs of serving children from economically deprived
backgrounds. Additional costs are expressed relative to the basic costs in a
large district. Especially among larger school districts, additional costs for
serving at risk children appear relatively consistent, ranging from about
thirty-five to about forty-five percent above basic costs.
TABLE 5. ESTIMATED COST ADJUSTMENTS FOR AT RISK
(RESOURCE COST)
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Table 6 presents the cost adjustments for meeting the needs of limited
English proficient children. For smaller school districts, those costs vary
dramatically, from 0 to 300 percent. But, for larger school districts, costs
range from about sixty percent above basic costs to about 100 percent above




TABLE 6. ESTIMATED COST ADJUSTMENTS FOR LIMITED ENGLISH
PROFICIENT (RESOURCE COST)
North




























Finally, Table 7 summarizes the additional costs estimated for at risk
and limited English proficient children in New York, across different re-
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gions of the state. In general, the researchers found that the additional costs
of bringing at risk children to state average performance standards were
approximately 100 percent or more above (or two times) state average
spending. Similarly, additional costs of bringing limited English proficient
(LEP) children to state average outcome standards exceeded 100 percent of
average costs. This latter finding, for LEP children, is consistent with the
findings of recent resource cost studies.
TABLE 7. ESTIMATED COST ADJUSTMENTS FOR AT RISK AND LIMITED
ENGLISH PROFICIENT (STATISTICAL MODEL: COST FUNCTION)
74
At Risk Limited English
(Free Lunch) Proficient
Region Marginal Cost Marginal Cost
Downstate Small Cities 1.07 1.24
Downstate Suburbs 0.98 1.21
N4ew York City 1.29 1.26
Yonkers 1.16 1.29
The Big Three (Upstate) 1.34 1.22
Upstate Rural 1.09 1.19
Upstate Small Cities 1.15 1.20
Upstate Suburbs 1.04 1.18
IV. COMMENTARY ON ADEQUACY ANALYSES
Various methods for estimating the cost of an adequate education and
how costs vary by district and student characteristics each have strengths
and weaknesses. It is safe to say, however, that some methods are stronger
and more empirically valid, at least for some purposes. For example, where
state legislatures have an interest in understanding costs as they relate spe-
cifically and explicitly to student outcome standards, statistical methods that
estimate directly the relationship between costs and outcome measures
should be used. The connection between resources and outcomes proposed
in professional judgment analyses is, at best, speculative. However, where
states define adequate education partly or entirely on the basis of curricular
opportunities that should be made available to students, resource cost analy-
ses may be most useful.
74. WILLIAM D. DUNCOMBE, EsTIMATING THE COST OF AN ADEQUATE EDUCATION IN
NEW YORK (Center for Policy Research, Working Paper #44, 2003).
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Perhaps most problematic in the context of state policy design are evi-
dence-based approaches to resource identification, like those used in Arkan-
sas and Kentucky. The exercise of adequacy analysis is ultimately intended
to measure the cost of implementing educational standards promulgated by
state legislatures and potentially reviewed by state courts. Professional:
judgment approaches purport to utilize state standards to guide resource
specification, which may be reasonable where state standards specifically
make mention of specific resources such as curricular offerings. Evidence-
based models measure not the cost of implementing specific state standards
but the cost of implementing specific educational models, in some cases
commercial products, promoted by individuals or teams of model develop-
ers. A cost analysis guided by Robert Slavin's Comprehensive School Re-
form Model Roots and Wings/Success for All done for the state of Kentucky
measures Robert Slavin's definition of an adequate education, and Robert
Slavin's preferred set of educational and social outcomes, not the Kentucky
legislature's preferred set of outcomes unless the legislature is willing to
explicitly defer to the model on this issue.
A final important issue regarding adequacy analyses in the context of
school finance litigation is the source of those analyses. Until recently, most
adequacy analyses had been sponsored by state legislatures in an effort to
inform policy redesign. In some cases those analyses were ordered by state
courts. The recent successful use of legislative sponsored analyses by plain-
tiffs challenging present funding has spawned a flurry of analyses across
states sponsored primarily by special interest and activist groups apparently
hoping to use those studies as evidence of flaws or shortcomings in existing
funding. These studies may produce findings that are useful to plaintiffs in
articulating the shortcomings of existing funding. However, it must be ob-
served that the burden on plaintiffs to validate that the study of education
costs they sponsored represents an accurate measurement of the costs of
achieving the legislature's standards is much greater than when the study is
sponsored, overseen, and accepted (or at least not refuted) by the legislature
itself.
V. BEYOND ADEQUACY
Two fundamental issues have emerged in recent years that are begin-
ning to exert major influence in the arena of education finance litigation.
The first concept is that states have begun to develop values and goals for
public schools in terms of student achievement and standards. Unwittingly,
these values and goals have lead to a quantitative standard of the success or
failure of school districts. As discussed previously, this result has led to the
argument that, by definition, these schools have failed and thus are deemed
to be inadequate. A second, and larger, thrust has emerged as perhaps an
unintended consequence as a result of the federal No Child Left Behind Act
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(NCLB) passed by Congress in December 2001 .75 This federal law based on
the concept of standards based reform requires each state to develop its own
standards, to identify those schools that fail those standards, and to further
identify those schools that do not make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP)
toward meeting those standards. Thus, in virtually every state, the plaintiffs
and defendants will be able to fully access, examine, and analyze each
school district's data, school by school, in order to determine which schools
are not making AYP. Then, it will be argued, by extension, the state has
demonstrated, on its own terms, and via federal statute, which schools are
failing to meet AYP and, by definition, regardless of the state aid distribu-
tion formula are deemed to be "inadequate" by such a definition. In fact,
one could suggest that this strategy will be piloted in a handful of states and,
if successful, will lead to the next major wave of public education finance
distribution challenges.
This presents a unique and difficult issue for a given state. First, it can
be equally argued that negative outcomes under NCLB or even specifically
"inadequate" outcomes as defined by state standards promulgated in re-
sponse to NCLB necessarily implicate the education finance distribution
funding formula as the cause of those outcomes. As such, these inadequate
outcomes alone, may prove to be just as problematic for the plaintiffs as
fruitful grounds for school finance challenge. There would, however, possi-
bly be grounds for challenge on either state constitutional adequacy or fed-
eral or state substantive due process if, for example a state implemented
high stakes testing in response to NCLB, then the legislature chose to dra-
matically underfund its highest need school districts relative to other school
districts, leading to much higher fail rates on the high stakes test in high
need school districts. However, even in this hypothetical, it could be argued
that the system would only be open to challenge not when the system as a
whole were underfunded but when specific types of schools, particularly
high need ones, were relatively underfunded.
Specifically, the NCLB calls for the identification of schools that are in
"need of improvement," or are "subject to corrective action." These stan-
dards of identification also call for schools to be identified that are "unsafe."
The standards call for all schools to have 100 percent of students achieve
proficiency on state standardized test by the year 2014. The number of
schools making such lists is predicted to be significant in many states. Un-
der NCLB each state sets its on standards, while this is certainly subject to
criticism from a variety of sources, it is interesting to note that it will, in the
long run, assist the plaintiffs in the education finance distribution challenges
in that since the state set the standard, issues of reliability and validity are
not germane to the state's defense.
75. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2002).
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Increasingly, more states are attempting to determine the true costs of
providing an adequate public elementary and secondary education. In some
instances, this attempt is the result of a suit in which the court directs the
legislature to make such a determination. In this manner, funding formula
distribution patterns and amounts can be obtained for the state. Specifically,
this was the result of a long history of litigation concerning the funding dis-
tribution patterns in the state of Arkansas.76 The Arkansas Supreme Court
directed the state to conduct an adequacy study. The court placed a January
2004 deadline for the legislature to remedy the state aid distribution formula
that it found to violate the state constitution. As a result, in September 2003,
the Arkansas Joint Committee on Educational Adequacy released a report
that determined that the overall spending for public elementary and secon-
dary education would have to increase by thirty-three percent to become
adequate and to achieve the state's standards."
The State of Ohio has presented a convoluted issue of judging ade-
quacy of the education finance distribution formula. 78 In 1997 the state su-
preme court in DeRolph v. State79 ruled that the state education finance dis-
tribution formula was unconstitutional and remanded to the common pleas
court. The state supreme court directed the legislature to change the distri-
butional formula. Plaintiffs again brought suit as to compliance and the or-
der was clarified.8 °
The state appealed and the state supreme court allowed additional time
for compliance. 8' The state supreme court ruled that the funding system was
still unconstitutional.82 After this decision, the legislature, again, increased
funding for public education in the amount of $ 1.4 billion. In September
2001, the court issued DeRolph I183 directing remedy measures for the leg-
islature. In December of 2001, the court appointed a mediator to work be-
tween the parties. In March of 2002, the mediator stated that he had failed to
produce an agreement between the parties.
The court vacated DeRolph III and held that DeRolph I and II were the
law of the state and stated that school funding was unconstitutional.84 In
76. See Lake View Sch. Dist. v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 481, 10 S.W.3d 892 (2000); see
also Lake View Sch. Dist. v. Huckabee, 76 S.W.3d 250, 349 Ark. 116 (2002); Tucker v.
Lake View Sch. Dist., 323 Ark. 693, 917 S.W.2d 530 (1996).
77. ALLAN ODDEN, ET AL., AN EVIDENCED-BASED APPROACH TO SCHOOL FINANCE
ADEQUACY IN ARKANSAS (2003).
78. See Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Miller v. Korns, 140 N.E.
773 (Ohio 1923).
79. DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
80. DeRolph v. State, 678 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 1997).
81. DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E. 993 (Ohio 2000) (DeRolph 1).
82. DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002) (DeRolph fl).
83. DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E, 1184 (Ohio 2001) (DeRolph III).
84. DeRolph, 780 N.E.2d at 529 (DeRolph IV).
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March of 2003, the state filed a writ of prohibition seeking that the court of
common pleas from exercising any further jurisdiction. On May 16, 2003,
the Ohio State Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Lewis85 in which
it ended further litigation by declaring the education finance distribution
formula was unconstitutional and directed the legislature to remedy the
situation. The court did not retain jurisdiction in this case.
In August of 2003, the plaintiffs filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari
before the U.S. Supreme Court contending that the state supreme court vio-
lated the U.S. Constitution's due process clause because it prevented the
enforcement of a court ordered remedy and denied the plaintiffs equal pro-
tection because Ohio school children were treated differently than other
successful litigants before the Ohio courts. In October of 2003 the Court
denied certiorari.86 Ohio illustrates a perfect instance in which the court
issues its directive and the legislature knowingly fails to follow its directive.
The state of Ohio illustrates the issues in which even if a court opinion were
to be offered and directed at the legislature, dependant upon the political
context of the state the actual implementation of such a directive is not a
foregone conclusion.
Several states have current adequacy suits in various stages. North
Carolina is a prime example of a state still within the restrictions of an ade-
quacy suit. In Leandro v. State87 the courts linked the failures of the plaintiff
school districts to the state learning standards. In a series of opinions, the
courts have ruled that the state must fund at-risk students. Hearings have
been held over several years. The court issued a number of interpretive or-
ders declaring that the failure of at-risk students was a function in insuffi-
cient state funding and lack of implementation of successful programs.88
The Wyoming Supreme Court ruled the state distributional formula
unconstitutional. 89 In doing so, the court ordered a detailed cost analysis.
The legislature had passed and identified the core knowledge and skills of
students so as to constitute a "proper" education. On February 23, 2001, the
Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the new cost-based distribution formula
and stated that it was capable of fulfilling the constitutional guarantees. 90
The court did note that a variety of factors should be analyzed every five
years and adjustments due to inflation at least every other year.
85. 789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003).
86. DeRolph v. Ohio, 540 U.S. 966 (2003) (denying the petition for writ of certiorari).
87. 468 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. App. t996).
88. See Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686 (N.C.
Super. Oct. 12, 2000), rev'd 599 S.E. 2d 365 (N.C. 2004).
89. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995)
90. State v. Campbell County School Dist. 19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001); see also State v.
Campbell County School Dist. 32 P. 2d 325 (Wyo. 2001).
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The State of New York has presented a lengthy and far reaching ade-
quacy issue. In Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State,91 the New York Su-
preme Court ruled that the New York City schools were inadequately
funded and therefore the state distributional formula was held to be uncon-
stitutional. On appeal, the appellate court ruled on behalf of the state in re-
quiring that the state's obligation was only for certain grade level proficien-
cies. The New York highest court, the State Court of Appeals on June 26,
2003 issued its ruling in Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State92 in which it
upheld the trial court stating that the public schools of New York City were
inadequately funded and thus unconstitutional and directed the state to de-
termine the cost of a "basic meaningful education" within the public schools
of New York City. The majority opinion, as described by the dissent, stated
under its final remedy summary the following:
The majority first directs the State to determine the actual cost of a
"sound basic education" and to ensure that every school in New York
City has the necessary funding to meet the standard, and sets a deadline.
The funding level must reflect the cost of a "sound basic education" that
is not tied to anything other than a "meaningful high school education."
The majority also remands the case to the trial court to review the Legis-
lature's efforts to determine if under the new funding scheme "inputs and
outputs improve to a constitutionally acceptable level."
This remedy is extraordinary, if not unprecedented. Having determined
that the State is not satisfying its constitutional obligations with respect
to the education of New York City's public school children, we should-
as the State requests-simply specify the constitutional deficiencies. It is
up to the Legislature, as the entity charged with primary responsibility
under the Education Article for maintaining the State's system of public
education, and the Executive, who shares responsibility with the Legis-
lature, to implement a remedy. This lawsuit should be at an end. Instead,
the majority, observing that "the political process allocates to City
schools a share of state aid that does not bear a perceptible relation to the
needs of City students," casts the courts in the role of judicial overseer
of the Legislature. This disregards the prudential bounds of the judicial
function, if not the separation of powers.
Moreover, as soon as the trial court is called upon to evaluate the cost
and educational effectiveness of whatever new programs are devised and
funded to meet the needs of New York City's school children, the educa-
tion policy debate will begin anew in another long trial followed by
lengthy appeals. The success of the new funding mechanism will then be
tested by outputs (proficiency levels). This dispute, like its counterparts
91. Id.
92. 801 N.E.2d at 326 (Read, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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elsewhere, is destined to last for decades, and, as previously noted, is
virtually guaranteed to spawn similar lawsuits throughout the State.
93
The overview of this arena indicates an uncertain patchwork of deci-
sions. Yet, despite the uneven record, there are indicators of which claims
have consistently received the most court sympathy or rejection. First, it is
extraordinarily rare to reach wealth as a suspect class. As stated very early
in Robinson, the unintended implications for society are too broad in that all
other government services could be immediately subject to the same claim.
Second, fundamentality is only slightly less rare, as courts are slow to con-
strue new rights from state constitutions and for which federal precedent is
adverse. Third, federal equal protection is derigueur in claim, but state
equal protection is a key to overturning state aid distribution formulas. This
is a strategy that does not usually work well unless the education article can
also be invoked in a plain reading that requires the state to accomplish what
it set out to do. For example, the Supreme Court of Texas in Edgewood in
1989 stated "[w]hether the legislature acts directly or enlists local govern-
ment to help meet its obligation, the end product must still be what the con-
stitution demands. 94 Taken collectively, this suggests that favorable rulings
depend at least in part on specific language in state constitutions. Again, as
Wood has stated, the successful party must have an outstanding legal team,
an outstanding education finance research team, and a well-grounded
knowledge of education finance research.95 While the relationship may not
be perfectly incremental as language increases, in most instances the oppor-
tunity for success does diminish rapidly as language becomes more vague.
A. Principles and New Directions in Litigation
First, it may be safely stated that litigation will not achieve great suc-
cess in federal courts due to limited avenues for bringing school finance
challenges to the federal courts. Given the present composition of the Su-
preme Court this seems highly unlikely as well as the Supreme Court's his-
torical reluctance to create new fundamental rights, that path will disappoint
reformers unless a nexus to other fundamental rights can be better estab-
lished. Despite Plyler, the Supreme Court has stood firm in determining that
education is a most important responsibility of state and local governments.
93. Id. at 368.
94. 777 S.W.2dat 19g.
95. R. Craig Wood, Presentation School Finance Litigation in Americzi, at the National
Organization on Legal Problems of Education (Nov. 1992); see also R. Craig Wood & Jef-
ftey Maiden, Resource Allocation Patterns Within School Finance Litigation Strategies, in




Similarly, wealth as a suspect class is an unfruitful attack unless the Su-
preme Court unexpectedly reverses itself or unless plaintiffs can show
overwhelming and consistent wealth-education discrimination against indi-
viduals. Likewise, federal equal protection will remain largely unavailable
except when established suspect classes can be linked to education finance
or where states overtly, differentially treat individuals without rational basis.
The only other alternative is by changes in the Supreme Court itself. Under
these conditions, a federal plea will receive sympathy only by dramatic
breakthroughs or by new political appointments.
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Second, we may confidently state that litigation will continue in state
courts into the foreseeable future. Although the record in state courts has
been mixed, plaintiffs have achieved their only successes at this level.
Within state courts, it is equally evident that the plea for fundamentality will
experience very limited success, as these courts will frequently apply the
federal test in the absence of strong state constitutional provisions. It must,
of course, be noted that few state constitutions have the language needed to
unquestioningly require strict scrutiny. Even when such language is present,
it should still be recognized that many courts will hesitate at fundamentality
because of the powerful analysis found long ago in Robinson in which the
Court perceptively recognized that society itself could be unintentionally
transformed by hasty declarations of fundamentality because even a noble
goal could be twisted under law by turning other mere social conveniences
into fundamental rights. As such, litigation in state courts will continue to
turn on issues other than fundamentality or wealth suspectness.
Third, it is likely that Serrano logic will have only limited utility in
that courts have generally moved beyond striking down education finance
distribution formulae that are unequal without evidence that inequality re-
suits in an inadequate education. While this result may appear regressive,
there is an attractive logic that underlies it. The court in Serrano presumably
did not care that the system could be adequate without being equal-in con-
trast, the predominance of subsequent decisions have attempted to deter-
mine if inequality were in fact followed by inadequacy. While the standard
appears to be lowered, it may be ultimately beneficial in that the linkages
between resources and equal opportunity will be resultantly strengthened
because plaintiffs will be required to demonstrate these effects. In the past
this has been a difficult hurdle for the plaintiffs. As discussed above, the No
Child Left Behind Act and the various state standards could conceivably
make such hurdles achievable in a relative fashion.
96. This discussion is confined to changes brought about by the legal system itself. It
does not consider other strategies such as congressional action or constitutional amendment
to achieve the same ends.
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. Fourth, the potential demise of Serrano logic also speaks to dubious
survival of strategies based only in noble theories and moral outrage. The
failure of this strategy is evident in the shambles of federal hopes after
Brown, leading to the conclusion that there is high regard for conscience in
the context of the law, but lawsuits are generally won by constitutional obli-
gations. Instances of "soft" litigation are rare, and the outrage in Pauley is
generally nonreplicable at the state level as well, as is its level of judicial
prescription. 97 Likewise, Wyoming's requirement of nearly equal expendi-
tures is not generally likely to recur elsewhere. This view is especially rein-
forced in compliance litigation, as even in Serrano 1198 the court was satis-
fied when most fiscal variations were erased. This logic was also echoed in
Horton 11,99 as the court under constitutional fundamentality required only
that disparities not be so great as to be unconstitutional. This was also the
overwhelming view of the Virginia Supreme Court in Scott v. Common-
wealth in which the court stated that disparities were acceptable as long as
all school districts were minimally adequate as defined by the state constitu-
tion. 100
Fifth, it is likely that the Robinson strategy of scrutinizing the educa-
tion clause of individual state constitutions will continue to be the most
promising strategy. This certainly applies in the latest adequacy suits. It is
also consistent with the foregoing in that the greatest scrutiny will likely rest
in how closely the state achieves its adequacy aims when measured against
its constitutional requirements and state imposed academic accountability
requirements.
Adequacy studies continue to evolve, as a tool for legitimately guiding
policy development, producing increasingly consistent results regarding
additional costs associated with school district characteristics and student
needs in recent years. Adequacy studies may have a place in school finance
litigation, especially where state legislatures, having sponsored their own
analyses, openly acknowledge inadequacies and inequities of existing
school funding and remain intractable. Cases that reach this extreme are
likely limited. As such, legislatures should approach cautiously while being
97. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979). Pauley stands almost alone in the
court's willingness to engage in judicial remedy for fiscal inequities. The court ordered crea-
tion of a Master Plan addressing in minute detail each deficiency of educational program and
its support mechanism, which today has resulted in millions of new dollars to education and
massive restructuring of education on a statewide basis that is linked to student outcomes. To
some extent, the same remedy can be seen in Kentucky where Rose v. Council, 790 S.W. 2d
t86 (t989) requixed total recorxstructieix of the educational system.
98. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
99. Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985).
100. 416 S.E.2d (Va. 2001). For a complete discussion of this case see R. Craig Wood,
Scott v. Commonwealth: Virginia Courts Consistently Rule Against Education Finance
Equalization Claims," 115 WEST'S EDnC. L. REPORTER 1.
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receptive to the need for stronger empirical bases on which to build rational
school finance policy. While lack of rational empirical information regard-
ing the overall cost of achieving desired outcomes may protect somewhat
against state constitutional adequacy challenges, lack of rational basis for
why current funds are allocated in greater amounts to some schools and
some children than to others may increase vulnerability to equal protection
challenges in either state or federal court.
Robinson demonstrated that fundamentality and suspectness are not
absolute prerequisites to success, and most subsequent winning litigation
stands as further proof to this truth. The ephemeral and intangible nature of
fundamental rights and wealth suspectness is frustrating to courts, which in
contrast can usually make plain reading of state education articles and apply
the more tangible concept of equal protection and the quantifiable standard
of some goal of adequacy. Given that courts have no dispositive proof to
presuming the linkage between wealth and opportunity, tying specific lan-
guage to factual analysis in the context of equal protection likely explains
the success of the Robinson strategy.
Sixth, it is likely that different decisions will continue to be handed
down by state courts using the Robinson strategy for several reasons. One
reason is obviously that different constitutions state significantly different
things. A second reason is that courts themselves cannot examine language
so dispassionately as to read nothing into the language except the words,
i.e., words are subject to perceptual political/social filter.'0 ' Still a third rea-
son is that the language in many state education articles is nearly empty. In
these cases, courts are exhibiting an interest in constitutional debate analysis
wherein the court examines the framing of the constitution to determine the
intent in the education article. Although it has been suggested that many
legislatures had no motive deeper than copying other states' education arti-
cles, the more recent decisions in Kentucky and Texas seriously examined
the framers' intent in order to determine the meaning of "thorough and/or
efficient" phrases. An increasingly common strategy combines the framers'
intent, litigation from similar states, measures of adequacy, or lack thereof,
as well as jurisdictional precedent to cast a plain reading of the education
article. Thus decisions will be different among the states, with some influ-
ence by other reform aided or deterred by the inclinations of the court itself.
Seventh, it is likely that courts will always be reluctant to engage in
specific judicial prescription as a remedy to education finance distribution
problems because courts are bound to respect the separation of powers. For
101. For an analysis of education finance litigation via a politicaVsocial interpretation see
Karen DeMoss, Political Dispositions and Education Finance Equity: An Analysis of Court
Decisions Across the United States (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago)
(on file with author).
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decades, courts have hesitated to intervene in legislative affairs, nothing that
they have neither the power nor the expertise to prescribe solutions to po-
litical questions. Courts generally rule only on questions of law brought
before them and direct the issues to the legislatures for remedy. As such, in
one sense courts are poor tools to force reform, as they will almost always
stop short of providing actual remedy.'02 In addition, the courts can actually
frustrate reform since a favorable decision for plaintiffs by no means guar-
antees immediate or receptive legislative response; for example, the re-
sponse to Edgewood in Texas was a call for a constitutional amendment that
would nullify the court's decision. Ohio, as discussed above, appears to be
no closer to an acceptable remedy that will satisfy the plaintiffs than it was
before DeRolph. The present legislative struggles as a result of Lake View'
0 3
in Arkansas appear to fall into this arena as well. Alternatively, however,
much progress has been wrought by litigation. As a consequence, a natural
tension will continue to slow reform, as courts will not readily pursue direct
intervention strategies. 1
04
Eighth, it is likely that reform will be slow and will remain incomplete
for many years. In one sense, the legal and policy issue was identified so
many years ago in Sawyer in 1912 when the court stated, "[t]he method of
distributing the proceeds of a tax rests in the wise discretion and sound
judgment of the Legislature. If this discretion is unwisely exercised, the
remedy is with the people, and not with the constitution,' l0 5 a view consis-
tently upheld and confirmed by Rodriguez. Thus, it should be noted that
legislatures may engage in policies that are perhaps unwise as long as these
policies are not unconstitutional. Under these conditions, it would seem that
reform has gained little ground in this regard. Yet, on the other hand, it is
encouraging to note that standards do change with the times, as contempo-
rary views regarding inequality have led to significant judicial intervention
by state courts. Indeed, Sawyer may have been right for the wrong reasons,
i.e., justice makes few errors of haste, and rapid change is often available
only at the voting polls. Thus litigants expecting dramatic events may be
disappointed. But it still should be stated that deliberateness can be benefi-
cial, as dizzying change may not be wise public policy.
102. Even where courts have become enthusiastic in judicial prescription, they have
usually later modified their zeal. See, e.g., Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. (1979).
103. Lake View Sch. Dist. v. Huckabee, 351 Ark. 31, 91 S.W.3d 472 (2002).
104. The question whether litigation actually leads to significant financial reform, that is,
greater equity as well as adequacy has yet to be clearly defined. See, e.g., Michael C. Petko,
A Statistical Analysis of the Effect that Education Finance Litigation Has On Per Student
Revenues in the United States (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Fla.) (on file
with author).
105. Sawyer v. Gilmore, 83 A. 673, 677 (Me. 1912).
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However, reality dictates that there are extreme cases in which the ju-
dicial branch must engage with the state legislature to seek a solution to the
manner and funding of public education within a given state. State legisla-
tures can be unable to recast the supply of state and local resources for pub-
lic elementary and secondary education for a variety of policy reasons. It is
a reality that in some instances state legislatures have engaged in arbitrary
and capricious allocation of funding that seriously disadvantages the state's
larger more urban school districts. In other instances, it has disadvantaged
small and rural school districts. Indeed this is primarily an equal protection
concern, but there are legitimate related adequacy concerns as well.
Emerging patterns from recent studies of the cost of education assist in
guiding policy reform either proactively, or reactively by producing new
benchmarks for judicial analysis. While inexact, recent findings are increas-
ingly consistent, and strikingly different than the current package of arbi-
trary recommendations that are most often thrown around for cost adjust-
ments.
The net sum of over a quarter century of intense education finance liti-
gation finally proves that the outcome of future lawsuits cannot be known.
Too many variables impact on an ever-changing social milieu, and the
courts themselves are never certain of whether to lead or to reflect society's
thinking. Courts seem at times to be ahead of the political readiness, while
in other obvious ways they are behind. The political climate of legislatures
adds greatly to the litigation equation, as states themselves shape the fre-
quency and intensity of litigation by the legislatures' relative vigilance to
equity concerns. While no amount of money can ever satisfy all parties,
most are satisfied when the distribution at least appears fair and is mini-
mally adequate. Legislatures, however, are generally faced with competing
demands from all corners of society for which sufficient funding is beyond
the means of the state. Yet there has been great change flowing from litiga-
tion; states have assumed greater shares, taxes have been better equalized,
and expenditures are higher. In addition, reform has become a political
agenda seized upon by presidents, governors, and legislators. Thus, while
equity has far to go, the power of a court should never be underestimated; if
it were not for litigation, it is absolutely certain that less progress toward
fundamental fairness in the financing of public elementary and secondary
education would exist today.
Although these conditions indicate that only uncertainty itself is cer-
tain, the long-range view still demands optimism. The political pendulum
swings, and equity and adequacy will continue to rise antd fade in cycles. It
cannot be otherwise because people will protect their resources, giving rise
to disputes. Public elementary and secondary education remains a great and
noble cause since life's opportunities are in large measure a product of the
education received by children. If money were inadequate to these ends,
[Vol. 27
